solve it." The puzzle, as Moyn frames it, is to "explain how, against its original purposes, the Gospel's message was brought down to earth." 3 "Like many others," Moyn observes of Siedentop, "he insists that something about the content of Christianity must have been decisive in making modern beliefs possible." But, he goes on to observe, "you need an argument to show this happened" and "Siedentop doesn't really have one." In short, he concludes, Siedentop "has no real theory of how Christianity birthed liberalism." 4 Nor, he suggests, does anyone else.
The Hypothesis
I think I have a solution to this puzzle. My hypothesis is that the answer to the puzzle can be found in the tradition of thought that evolved out of the doctrine of divine accommodation which was the common property of Judaism and Christianity 5 from the time of their first encounters with classical rhetoric, 6 whence the hermeneutic principle of accommodation was derived. As I explain in the section on "Sources" below, this idea is hardly original; other scholars can justly take credit for the discovery of the doctrine of divine accommodation at the root of modern political ideas. 7 My hypothesis is derived from this important body of work on the doctrine of divine accommodation. But it is also based on other scholarship on the derivation of modern political thought from theological principles, in particular, twentieth century and contemporary scholarship on "political theology."
Although the more familiar ways of discussing political theology do not connect it to the doctrine of divine accommodation, the core features of political theology as it has been conceptualized are nonetheless assimilable to that doctrine's logical 4 Id. 5 On Islam 6 On the classical principle of accommodation, see KATHY structure and core ideas. Or to put it the other way around, the core ideas in the doctrine of divine accommodation are assimilable to the logic of the state of emergency associated with political theology. That connection (one might even say equation) between the logic of emergency law and the logic of divine accommodation requires further spelling out. Part of my hypothesis (the historical part) is that the connection between emergency law and the principle of accommodation was spelled out-and then later left aside-in a tradition of political theory that was derived from the doctrine of divine accommodation over the course of many centuries. Reconstructing the evolution of this intellectual tradition, as it underwent continuing elaboration and revision producing many different theories about how government should relate to different beliefs and how law should be administered, is an important project that has yet to be undertaken in systematic way.
What makes the hypothesis plausible even without that historical confirmation (and what makes that historical investigation worth undertaking) is the presence of a distinctive picture of law that can be discerned in even the earliest iterations of the doctrine of divine accommodation, which recurs in later applications and formulations of political theory. In this picture, secular law is viewed as a divine accommodation to the state of emergency that would exist in the absence of the institution of secular law. This is a conception of law that is at once a description of what secular law is, an explanation of why it is necessary, and a theologically grounded justification for its institution.
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This recurring picture of secular law was implicit in the foundational principles of the doctrine of divine accommodation even before they underwent systematic development into full-blown political and legal philosophies. Those foundational principles included:
(1) "God adjusted his acts in history to the capacity of men to receive and perceive them." 8
(2) "The Scriptures are adjusted to the capacity of mankind of to receive and perceive them." 9 (3) "The law was given to all in a language to be understood by all." 10 As the third of these propositions makes explicit, the doctrine of divine accommodation was, from the beginning, concerned with law and tied to a very particular view of it. Less a static concept than a dynamic set of ideas that could be combined and recombined in different ways, the conception of law embedded in the doctrine of divine accommodation was the product of an ongoing argument about how God's law could be followed given the existence of disagreement, and lack of certainty, about what the content of God's law is. That argument began from the premise that divine law (and God) exists. From that premise (combined with other premises about God's nature), the argument worked its way through a series of logical steps to the conclusion that, in the here and now of the temporal world, divine law has to be suspended and replaced by law created by human beings. The 8 Funkenstein, at 213, 222. 9 Id. at 214. Otherwise put, "The Scripture speaks in the language of everyday man." Id. at 215. 10 Funkenstein at 214.
doctrine of divine accommodation thus generated a theological argument for the necessity of secular law.
So conceived, secular law has a complex and paradoxical relationship to the divine law from which it derived. On the one hand, it was understood to be precisely not divine law, but rather, an anthropological "manmade" artifact, authored by human beings who occupy the positions of legislators and enforcers of the law governing a particular society and/or a product of human societies and cultures that differed over time and place. As such, secular law was understood (a)
to be independent from, (b) to deviate from and, (c) in some instances, actually to violate the requirements of sacred law.
On the other hand, secular law was thought to be reflective of the divine law in at least two different ways. First, although the idea of divine accommodation to the limits of human understanding allowed for human error in the knowledge of God (the need to accommodate human error being the doctrine's core idea), to say that human understanding of God's law is imperfect is not the same as saying it is nonexistent. The flip side of the belief that human law is an imperfect reflection of God's law is a belief that it is a reflection of God's law. The picture of law as an imperfect reflection of God's law was traditionally combined with the further idea (another core principle of accommodationist thought) that human societies were implanted with a mysterious capacity to increase their understanding of God's law over time. 11 Together, these notions of partial but imperfect understanding of God's law and teleological progress towards a more perfect understanding reflected a 11 On divine cunning see Benin, Funkenstein.
belief in the possibility (and aspiration) of human law being and becoming ever more congruent with the divine law in terms of its content, even if it was humanly authored and therefore subject to error.
This idea of an overlap and eventual convergence between the content of divine and secular law was one way in which human law could be said to "reflect" divine law even as it deviated from it. But that stood in tension with the second way in which the doctrine imagined human law to "reflect" the divine law, which had to do with its understanding of non-divine human law as being divinely authorized, if not exactly divinely authored. Here, human law became even more distant from divine law, as the doctrine posited that God himself authorized the suspension of His law and its replacement by manmade laws and legal institutions. On this view, divine law truly was hidden, and consequently, human law truly was autonomous of it.
Such an essentially humanist conception (we might as well name this birthplace of humanism, not just liberalism) could have only the most tenuous connection to divine law, even if such a human-centered view of historical and legal agency was thought to be a part of the grand divine design.
The reasoning that produced this radically destabilizing conclusion went as follows. Like human law, divine law has two parts: substantive and procedural. The substantive laws are the behavioral commandments, the positive and negative injunctions, the shalts and shalt nots. The procedural laws are the rules of evidence and other procedural safeguards that judges must follow before they can draw a conclusion about whether the substantive law has been violated. to commit evil acts? To some, the answer was yes. Theological quietists justified this position by denying the premise that following the procedural rules of divine law that prevent human beings from enforcing the law produces a world in which crimes are committed with impunity and the law is never enforced. Their refutation of this premise lay in the widely accepted "fact" (that is, the religious belief then taken as fact) that the law does get enforced and everyone does meet their just deserts-in the afterlife. In this view, God and God alone is the law enforcer (executor and judge as well as the legislator of the law), because God alone can be a perfect law enforcer. Such a purist refusal to tolerate (or, we might say, accommodate) even the slightest imperfection in the enforcement of the law counseled an extreme political quietism that appealed to a certain strain of radical skepticism which viewed human knowledge as so hopelessly fallible that it is worse for human beings to try alleged wrongdoers than to do nothing at all. 13 Adherents of the doctrine of divine accommodation rejected this extreme form of skepticism and do-nothingism. Just as they thought that the imperfect nature of human law's reflection of the divine did not imply a total lack of reflection of divine law, so too their acceptance of the imperfect nature of human cognition did not imply a total rejection of human beings' ability to attain factual and moral knowledge. To the contrary, although the doctrine of divine accommodation was motivated by a skeptical view of human beings' capacity for knowledge that emphasized their cognitive fallibility, this was a version of fallibilism that parted company from the more radical anti-rationalist forms of skepticism underlying quietism. The doctrine of divine accommodation reflected an essentially pragmatic version of rationalism according to which human beings have the capacity for reason and, with that, for a certain kind of knowledge-not the knowledge of absolute truths, which were acknowledged to be inaccessible to human beings, but probable truths to which human reason does have access and which supply an adequate foundation for human judgments.
This probabilistic version of rationalism (i.e., pragmatism), which spoke to the doctrine's epistemological concerns, was coupled with the doctrine's similarly nonfatalistic position on theodicy. To the quietist proposition that it was God's will for people to suffer patiently and wait for justice to be done until after they died, the doctrine of divine accommodation countered that a benevolent God could not possibly have intended for human beings to live in the world of chaos and violence that would result in the absence of effective law enforcement institutions on earth.
They rejected the ideal of Christ-like martyrdom that religious quietists embraced as an untenable demand to impose on ordinary human beings that could not possibly be the will of God.
That left open the question of what God's will was. If enforcing God's law through human legal and political institutions is impossible given the inherent defects of human cognition, and if the posture of radical quietism is not the will of the God, then what does God will human beings and societies to do about wrongdoers and wrongdoing? While quietism was ruled out by the doctrine of divine accommodation, so too was the traditional way of refuting the quietist prescriptions of the radical skeptics, which was to deny the premise that all human judgment is fallible by positing the existence of an infallible human authority through whom God's law flows. If such a divinely ordained infallible human authority could be found to exist, then the problem of fallible human judgment would go away, and then there would be no dilemma about whether to set up legal institutions capable of rendering judgments to resolve. The only issue would be establishing the existence and identity of the infallible authority on earth, a problem customarily "solved" through the usual combination of (religious) faith and (political) fiat.
This belief in an infallible human authority in whom God's law is perfectly revealed (and through whom His will is perfectly implemented and enforced) is the foundation of the various traditional schools of political thought that have been the focus of most modern scholarship on political theology. 14 But it forms no part of the equally venerable (though less well-recognized and always contested) tradition of political theology that evolved out of the doctrine of divine accommodation. To the contrary, the doctrine of divine accommodation arose only when the belief in the kind of all-knowing humanus ex machina that rescues such "conservative" political theologies was ruled out. Like the radical skeptics/quietists (whose other positions they rejected), the adherents of the doctrine of accommodation recognized that all human beings' judgments are fallible. Why God made human beings with cognitive faculties so faulty that they were always subject to error-why God, being all powerful, had not just instilled in human beings (or at least in one of them) perfect knowledge of His law-these were questions that proponents of the doctrine pondered but determined no mere mortal could answer. That he had done so was the accommodationist tradition's foundational premise. Combined with the further premise what God creates God approves, it followed that God approved of our faulty cognitive faculties and accommodated them. accommodation (a principle of hermeneutics developed by the ancient Greeks originally addressed to secular texts) to the "embarrassments" of the biblical text.
These postulations went hand in hand with the development of the view that God, for His inscrutable reasons, preferred this evolutionary approach to simply implanting correct knowledge of His law in the human mind. In other words, God chose to create a world in which different peoples held different beliefs, some if not all of which had to be in error. The conclusion in short was that God deliberately allowed for human error. More than that, it was postulated that erroneous human beliefs served as God's chosen vehicle through which to gradually advance humanity toward a less erroneous understanding of His law. Thus the doctrine of divine accommodation attached itself to the view that human knowledge is evolutionary and always bound by its historical and cultural context. That was coupled with the view that God approves of the coexistence of diverse beliefs about religion and law.
And that in turn was coupled with the belief that the inherently limited and errant nature of any particular belief-system (and human knowledge more generally) is acceptable to God. Far from prohibiting us from acting (and judging) on our imperfect knowledge, God accommodates Himself to our imperfect versions of legal and religious knowledge. This was the essential lesson of the doctrine of divine accommodation.
The doctrine of divine accommodation thus steered the proverbial middle course between the polar positions of extreme skepticism, on the one hand, and belief in an infallible religious and legal authority, on the other. Against both of these extreme (though historically commonplace) views, the doctrine of divine accommodation posited the existence of a faculty of human reason that was fallible but nonetheless adequate to the task of preventing that world from falling into the state of chaos, violence and disorder (which, it was understood, would be the inevitable result if law was not enforced until mortal life was over). What alibied the adequacy of this imperfect knowledge and law-which plainly was inadequate from the standpoint of sacred law as it inevitably produced wrongful convictions, wrongfully and sinfully depriving people of liberty and life-was the belief that it was God's will to accommodate His law to our cognitive imperfections and to our human need for safety and protection. "The Scriptures are adjusted to the capacity of mankind of to receive and perceive them." 17 "The law was given to all in a language to be understood by all." 18 These propositions were understood by their adherents to imply that the faulty understandings and applications of God's law that human law necessarily embodied were not just acceptable to God, but somehow a part of His divine plan.
The paradoxical conclusion of this line of reasoning was that divine law authorizes its own suspension. Divine law authorizes the substitution of divine law with defective human law as an accommodation to the limitations of human cognition that make it impossible for human beings to know and enforce God's law.
In order for human beings to be able to enforce law, it is necessary for them to construct legal systems with less stringent standards of evidence and procedural safeguards than those prescribed in the bible (i.e., by God). And that, according to 17 Id. at 214. Otherwise put, "The Scripture speaks in the language of everyday man." Id. at 215. what is needed (and divinely authorized) is an institution capable of enforcing the law and establishing order reflects a statist philosophy that seems fundamentally at odds with liberalism. Indeed, when we look at the actual historical development of the accommodationist tradition of thought, we see that many of the specific theories formulated on the basis of its principles epitomize conservative political philosophy, which is conventionally taken to be ipso facto anti-liberal. In short, a number of quintessentially "conservative" ideas seem clearly to be present in the doctrine, to wit, its statism and its emergency theory of the state (these may be one and the same thing), not to mention its theological foundations (which may be reconcilable with liberalism but how has yet to be explained). Conversely, recognizably liberal ideas seem to be absent, at least I have yet to demonstrate the presence of any liberal political ideas-and were I to do so, it would remain to be explained how such liberal elements of the doctrine could coexist with the illiberal elements identified above.
But an explanation of the liberal character of this doctrine's conception of law As the doctrine's argument about the need to relax the standards of due process makes clear, it was entirely possible to interpret it in a way that justified illiberal state policies both with respect to issues of religious tolerance and with respect to issues of due process. Indeed, there was little in the way of political theory and competing models of government that such a temporizing doctrine could not justify as a necessary (and therefore divinely ordained) accommodation to the need for law and order.
Yet another, related way of justifiying illiberal policies was to present them as part of the evolutionary mission of moving errant believers towards correct belief.
Thus the Holy Roman Empire was depicted as the agent through which God had chosen to convert people with false beliefs and thereby bring the evolutionary process of knowledge formation to its teleological endpoint. 20 As this example shows, both as a logical matter and as a historical matter, the doctrine admitted of various interpretations, including many of a decidedly conservative illiberal nature.
But the doctrine also admitted of more liberal interpretations. If illiberal policies and theories of government could logically be derived from its premises, so too could liberal policies and theories of government. More than that, the dialectical nature of the theory combined with the belief that God accommodated human needs and differences to create a kind of propulsive force that moved the theory in an ever more liberal, humanist direction. The same idea of divine cunning which imagined that human societies were evolving through a divinely ordained yet human process toward greater understanding of the divine that some used to justify a religiously intolerant inquisitorial missionizing state could just as well-or, arguably, better-20 See Funkenstein.
be used to justify a liberal state. Even if such liberal policies such as protecting rights to due process and freedom of belief were not logically required, they were certainly logically permitted by the fundamental precepts of the doctrine. And it was increasingly hard to justify the refusal of human beings and governments to accommodate "errant" (i.e., different) beliefs in the face of a picture of a benevolent merciful God who accommodated Himself to human error and difference. (Here the imago dei makes its appearance). It was similarly difficult to justify a complete forfeiture of the rights of due process in the face of a view of sacred law that was highly protective of such rights. Even if the theory of the state of emergency that justified relaxing those standards was persuasive, it by no means followed that those standards had to be completely abandoned. To the contrary, there was every reason-given the belief that sacred law protected due process and that wrongful convictions were a sin-to crank up the standards of evidence and procedural rules that provided safeguards against wrongful convictions, not to the point where the law became completely unenforceable, but to achieve the appropriate "balance" between the competing interests of protecting people from private violence and protecting the accused from state violence, both of which were viewed as sanctioned by God.
Finally, in addition to liberal policies of pluralism and process, secularism itself represented a liberal policy that was built in to the accommodationist picture of law.
Though the separation of secular law from religious law that was dictated by the doctrine could be, and was, institutionalized in many different ways, many of which would not be recognizable today as liberal or secularist, the insistence that the law of the state could not be mistaken for or equated with canon law or Jewish law by definition and by divine design was a constant challenge to those who claimed that political rulers had religious authority, or that religious authorities had authority over political rulers or that the law of the state was the law of God. True, even the Holy Roman Empire could claim to abide by this principle of separation between the "two kingdoms" as could many other regimes that violate our sense of a liberal state.
But even if it has to be conceded that the doctrine of divine accommodation could be used to justify the most illiberal inquisitorial intolerant forms of government, it also has to be recognized that it created a continual pressure to question the sufficiency of any regime's instantiation of the principles it purported to realize (namely, the principles of divine accommodation.) What the doctrine justified as (merely)
adequate-and adequacy, not perfection, was all that the doctrine ever justifiedcould always be re-characterized as inadequate from the ever-available theological standard of perfection. (At least it remained available until the dialectic of humanism threw its theological ladder away.) The dialectical nature of the theory provided a ratchet that was always available for, and indeed encouraged the development of, internal critique. Whether that ratchet moved in the direction of more due process (or pluralism or humanism or separation of state from religion) or less was in theory debatable since no one knew for sure which of these policies was closer to God. As the theory of divine accommodation and divine cunning would have it, God, having left the scene of human activity, had left it to fallible human agents to figure things out for themselves. But while that would seem to allow for the theory to evolve in either a conservative or a liberal direction, the principle of fallibilism itself, like the cognate principles of the doctrine of divine accommodation (pragmatism, probabilism, pluralism, process and accommodation of human differences and needs), propels the dialectic to unfold in a liberal and ultimately humanist (post-liberal?) direction rather than its opposite.
Liberalism, so construed, never becomes detached from the statist theory of emergency law, bearing out the critique of liberalism, which maintains, correctly, that liberal regimes are regimes of power that are inherently repressive. But it does, as it were, liberalize the state of emergency, imbuing it with qualities, such as the rule of law, due process, and various policies of pluralism and accommodation of difference, that belie the proposition that the permanent state of emergency negates the rule of law and renders liberalism an illusion.
All of this would not be so hard to see were it not for the fact that liberal political theory has been torn asunder from the principles of accommodation and emergency generally. The conclusion then drawn is that if accommodationist theory is revealed to be an emergency theory, it too must be anti-liberal. But once we put the two halves back together, we can see that the law of transitivity can-and, in point of historical fact, did-just as well work the other way. There is, after all, no more reason to assume that the statist logic of emergency cancels out the liberal nature of the state depicted in the doctrine of divine accommodation than to suppose that the principle of accommodation cancels out the illiberal nature of the emergency state that it depicts. The logical possibility-and historical actuality-of the latter outcome (the principle of accommodation serving to liberalize the emergency state and accommodate it to "normal life," thereby turning it into normal law) is what I hypothesize we will find when we reconstruct conceptual logic and historical development of the theory of divine accommodation.
accommodation is the only version or whether there are alternative versions of law derived from that doctrine which are not connected to emergency theories of politics are further questions that needs to be explored According to this hypothesis, the principle of accommodation served to liberalize the emergency state by infusing it with the values of pluralism, procedural justice and church-state separation. Secular law, depicted in the doctrine of divine accommodation as not just a regime of emergency law but as the Ur-emergency law, was also, by that token, depicted as normal law, as the law that accommodates normal human needs and is adapted to ordinary conditions. Thus the law that has been constituted per the logic of the state of emergency becomes, through its perduration and accommodation to normal life, normal law, liberal law.
The Challenge I offer the above hypothesis as a potentially illuminating example of the methodological questions and challenges that arise when we bring law together with intellectual history, in particular, the history of Jewish (and Christian) thought.
It is, as it currently stand, no more than a hypothesis. What is largely though, tantalizingly, not entirely missing from both Eden and
Funkenstein is a systematic focus on the theories of politics and law that evolved out of this intellectual tradition. Law is not entirely missing from their accounts for it is nestled at the core of the doctrine, and radiates out into every one of the sciences 22 See fn 1, supra. they describe, each of which is shown to rest on the basic argument about the withdrawal from the world of divine law and the need to accommodate human needs. The result is that law is both everywhere and nowhere in these books, a pervasive presence that informs every single field of thought that they do discuss but a field of thought that merits sustained attention in its own right. because those authors did not see any connection to liberalism or to emergency theories of politics, or perhaps because those subjects simply lay beyond the horizons of their projects.
Those links begin to come through in other works on the doctrine of accommodation, in particular, works in the field of Jewish studies that are specifically focused on the political theories and conceptions of law that were derived from that doctrine. Stephen Benin's work on "The Footprints of God" and "The "Cunning of God'" and Suzanne Stone's work on "Legal Pluralism in Jewish
Law" are exemplars. Unlike Funkenstein and Eden, these are works that are specifically focused on the political and legal theories that were developed, here by the rabbis, from the doctrine of divine accommodation. Stone draws particular attention to the concern with rights of due process and her work shows how a certain tradition of rabbinic thought simultaneously espoused the logic of emergency law and implicitly rested on the idea that it was both necessary-and, paradoxically, divinely authorized-to accommodate to human needs by suspending the divine law with its impossibly strict procedural standards.
It is impossible to read these works without noticing the resonance with the applications of the principle of divine accommodation described by Funkenstein and The principle of divine accommodation thus completes the justification for imposing the state of emergency, which otherwise remains incomplete and unexplained. Conversely, the logic of emergency law explains how the principle of divine accommodation moves law from the realm of the sacred into the earthly realm and reshapes it in the process.
Without the benefit of reconstructing this logic, such a plainly statist political philosophy, which justifies the sacrifice of rights of due process for the sake of law and order, would be seem to be a quintessentially illiberal, if not anti-liberal, philosophy, in keeping with the Schmittian proposition that the conditions of a permanent state of emergency negate the rule of law and render the liberal theory of law an illusion. Like the conception of political theology put forward by Schmitt, the accommodationist theory espouses the theory that a state capable of enforcing law unhampered by due process principles that are impossible to meet is a necessary (and divinely authorized) response to a permanent state of emergency.
In order to see the inherently liberal character of the conception of secular law produced by the doctrine of divine accommodation, it is necessary to break down its essential characteristics, the better to see how they fit together and understand how what seem like paradoxical combinations of elements are connected to one another.
My hypothesis has isolated five characteristics.
(1) The theory of law produced by the doctrine of divine accommodation is a theological theory of law, grounded in a belief in the existence of God and divinely authored law; its principles about how legal and political institutions should be constituted are derived from traditional theological principles and doctrines.
(2) It is a secularist theory that argues that secular law is a necessity and legitimate human authorship and human enforcement of the law.
(3) It is an emergency theory that follows the logic of emergency law, justifying the suspension of the strict due process standards of "the" law.
(4) It is a liberal theory (or at least a proto-liberal theory), revolving around three liberal concerns, namely (i) due process rights; (ii) cultural pluralism and tolerance for diverse beliefs; (iii) separation of church and state; although the theory admits of different opinions regarding whether, or how, human systems of government should mimic God's tolerance and acceptance of different and errant beliefs; God's refusal to countenance wrongful convictions; and God's authorization of the separation of human legal institutions from divine law, the belief in God's commitment to these three beliefs remains a constant goad to reconsider whether the established institutions and arrangements of political and religious authority comport with these belief's about God's nature.
(5) It is a dialectical theory, which sees human societies, legal systems and theories of law and politics as containing a built-in propulsive force moving them toward ever more perfect realizations of its principles (which is to say it is taken as a given that every existing theory and system will always be an imperfect realization subject to internal critique.)
The tradition's conception of law is thus both theological and secularist, a seeming paradox that is readily resolved by tracking the logical lines of argument according to which the need for secular law is derived from theological propositions.
We can also clearly now how this conception of law could be both liberal and reliant upon the logic of the emergency state and emergency law. This second paradox will which requires further explication and exploration. The accommodationist argument figures secular law as the ur-emergency law, the law that is ushered in when the divine law is suspended, as it necessarily is when human beings are not capable of applying divine law, which is simply to say, always. It does not follow from this point of agreement with the Schmittian construction of political theology that there is no rule of law and that the liberal belief in due process (and other liberal values) is "an illusion," negated by the necessity of emergency law. What does follow is what I hope to explore in further work investigating this hypothesis.
